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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
Issue 1: Did the district court err in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt of court for 
failing to pay $41,000 to Mr. Taylor by January 1, 2010, without entering any findings on 
the issue of contempt and despite the fact that she had been attempting to make 
arrangements with Mr. Taylor for payment? 
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved in the district court 
during the January 25, 2010, hearing. (R. 02086.) 
Standard of Review: The court's failure to enter findings of fact on the issue of 
contempt is a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 
P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). 
"The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action "is so 
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of 
discretion." Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, ^8. 
Issue 2: Did the district court err in imposing conditions for purging the contempt 
that were entirely unrelated to the issue for which Mrs. Taylor was held in contempt? 
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved in argument in the district 
court at the January Hearing. (R. 02118.) 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. 
Issue 3: Did the district court err in holding that Mrs. Taylor had not satisfied the 
conditions for purging the contempt at the February Hearing? 
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved at the February 8, 2010 
hearing. (R. 02118.) 
Standard of Review: The court's failure to enter findings of fact on the issue of 
contempt is a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 
P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). 
"The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action "is so 
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of 
discretion." Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, ^ |8. 
Issue 4: Did the district court err in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failing to 
cooperate in obtaining a passport for her minor child without making sufficient findings 
on the issue of contempt and despite Mrs. Taylor's belief that she had complied with the 
Court's orders? 
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved at the February 8, 2010 
hearing. (R. 02118.) 
Standard of Review: The court's failure to enter findings of fact on the issue of 
contempt is a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 
P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). 
"The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action "is so 
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unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of 
discretion.'* Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, ^ 8 
Issue 5: Did the district court err by imposing unduly harsh and improper 
sanctions against Mrs. Taylor for contempt? 
Preservation in District Court: This issue was preserved at the February Hearing. 
(R. 02118.) 
Standard of Review: This issue is a mixed question of law and fact. Although 
"sanctions imposed for contempt [are also reviewed] for abuse of discretion," Barton v. 
Barton, 2001 UT App 199 ^ 9, the sanctions must comply with the governing contempt 
statute in Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-310. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of the following rules and statutes is determinative of this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(5): 
A party may be held in contempt for "disobedience of any lawful judgment, order 
or process of the court." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-302(2): 
When an alleged contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence 
of the court or judge, an affidavit or statement of the facts by a judicial officer 
shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting contempt. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-310: 
If the court finds the person is guilty of contempt, the court may impose a fine not 
exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 
30 days, or both. However a justice court judge or court commissioner may 
punish for contempt by a fine not to exceed $500 or by incarceration for five days 
or both. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
1. Appellant Trisha Richard Taylor ("Mrs.Taylor") and Paul McKinney 
Taylor ("Mr. Taylor") were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered in the case 
styled Taylor v. Taylor, case no. 054300395 DA., in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Tooele County, State of Utah ("Decree"). 
2. On January 25, 2010, Judge Stephen L. Henriod held a hearing on various 
motions from both parties in the divorce action, including Mr. Taylor's Countermotion 
requesting that Mrs. Taylor be held in contempt for failing to pay a debt owed to Mr. 
Taylor and for failing to cooperate in obtaining a passport for the minor children. (R. 
02075.) 
3. At the January Hearing, the district court held Mrs. Taylor in contempt for 
"failing to pay the $41,000 when due" and sentenced Mrs. Taylor to 30 days in jail, plus a 
$1,000 fine and an award of fees and costs. (R. 02076.) 
4. However, the court further ordered that Mrs. Taylor could "purge the 
contempt" by "getting passports done within five days and paying the $41,000 with 24 
hours." (R. at 02076.) 
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5. The Court did not enter any findings of fact or conclusions of law from that 
hearing. The Court did not enter an order on the January 25, 2009 hearing until March 4, 
2010. (R. 02130.) 
6. On February 5, 2010, Mr. Taylor's counsel filed an affidavit, representing 
to the court that Mrs. Taylor had not satisfied the conditions for purging the contempt. 
(R. 02096-02094.) 
7. On February 8, 2010, the court held a review hearing ("February Hearing"). 
(R. 02117.) 
8. Following the hearing, the district court held Mrs. Taylor in contempt and 
sentenced her to 30 days in jail plus a $1,000 fine and Mr. Taylor's attorneys' fees and 
costs. (R. 02165.) 
9. Mrs. Taylor filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief, which was denied. 
(R. 02139.) 
10. Mrs. Taylor timely filed a Notice of Appeal on March 31, 2010. (R. 
02166.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mrs. Taylor and Mr. Taylor were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce 
entered in the case styled Taylor v. Taylor, case no. 054300395 DA., in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Tooele County, State of Utah. 
2. On or about May 4, 2009, the special master issued a Special Master Report 
and Order ("Report"), which stated that "the parties agree that the children are in need of 
passports" and directed them to "cooperate in obtaining a passport" for their younger 
child. (R. 01460.) 
3. Shortly thereafter, the parties met at the post office to submit a passport 
application, but the child was not with them and Mr. Taylor did not have all the necessary 
paperwork. (R. 2045-55.) Mrs. Taylor took a half-day off work and canceled all of her 
patients in order to travel from Tooele to Farmington for that meeting. (R. 02086 at 20.) 
4. On May 27, 2009, Mrs. Taylor filed an Objection and Motion to Vacate 
Special Master Report and Order. (R. 01497.) 
5. After several attempts to schedule a mutually agreeable time, the parties 
made arrangements to meet again to submit the application on July 16. (R. 02044.) 
6. Mrs. Taylor felt that she needed to "clear things up with Mr. Florence," the 
special master, regarding the fact that she did not consent to the child having a passport. 
(R. 02086 at 20.) 
7. Therefore, on July 13, 2009, Mrs. Taylor communicated to Mr. Taylor and 
to the special master her concerns about obtaining a passport for the younger child. (R. 
02015.) 
8. On July 14, 2009, Mrs. Taylor sent an email to the special master stating 
that, contrary to his Report, she did not consent to obtaining a passport for the child and 
that she understood that a parent could not be ordered to give consent to have a passport 
issued to a minor child. (R. 02013; R. 02086 at 19; R. 02044-42.) 
9. On July 19, 2009, the special master responded by email, stating that it was 
his understanding that the parties had consented to get a passport for the younger child 
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and that he had made his Report accordingly. The special master stated that his Report 
would remain unless modified or rescinded by the Court. (R. 2012.) 
10. On July 21, 2009, Mrs. Taylor responded by email, stating that she believed 
she had complied with his Report regarding the passport. (R. at 2011.) 
11. On September 3, 2009, the district court entered an order denying Mrs. 
Taylor's motion to vacate the Report. (R. 01732.) 
12. On September 8, 2009, Mrs. Taylor sent an email to the special master, 
reiterating his comment that he had made the statements about the passport in his Report 
because he believed that she consented to it. She asked him "to defer the issue of 
overriding a parent consent. . . now that you better understand my objections." She also 
stated: "The purpose of this email as well is to present the fact that 1 feel I have 
complied with your original request to cooperate and ask you to please acknowledge that 
I did." (R. 2008 (emphasis in original); R. 02042.) 
13. The special master responded on September 9, 2009, acknowledging that 
the conclusions in his Report regarding the passport were based on his understanding that 
she agreed to get a passport for the younger child. He stated: "If you think you have 
cooperated in doing what you were to do and Paul thinks you have not, then he can take it 
to the Court. If you think that circumstances have changed and that I ought to rescind 
that Order then please make it clear that is what you are requesting, but I will tell you that 
based on what you have said in your email on this subject, if that is it, then I probably 
would not be inclined to change my Order but I will give you another shot at it." (R. at 
2007 (emphasis added)). 
14. On November 20, 2009, Mrs. Taylor, acting pro se, filed two motions to 
show cause relating to child support and the parties' parenting agreement. 
15. On January 18, 2010, Mr. Taylor filed a Countermotion in response, 
requesting that Mrs. Taylor be held in contempt for failing to cooperate in obtaining a 
passport for the parties' younger child and for failing to pay the $41,000 owed to Mr. 
Taylor. (R. 02205.) 
16. Pursuant to an Amended Order, dated September 3, 2009, Mrs. Taylor had 
been ordered to pay $41,000 to Mr. Taylor by January 1, 2010. (R. 01747.) 
17. On January 25, 2010, Judge Stephen L. Henriod held a hearing ("January 
Hearing") on the motions from both parties, including Mr. Taylor's Countermotion. (R. 
01400.) 
18. Mrs. Taylor represented herself pro se at the January Hearing. Mr. Taylor 
was represented by Gayanne K. Schmid. (R. 01400.) 
19. In response to the court's questioning at the January Hearing, Mrs. Taylor 
informed the district court that she was in the process of selling her business and intended 
to pay the $41,000 to Mr. Taylor from the proceeds of the sale. (R. 02086 at 6.) 
20. She further explained that she had told Mr. Taylor that she was "more than 
happy to pay" but that she would "like it to be paid out of the closing or my business 
[t]hat is going to be accomplished in January of 2010." (R. 02086 at 6.) 
21. Mrs. Taylor explained that she had contacted Mr. Taylor and "sent him 
many emails" to make the necessary arrangements for payment of the $41,000. She 
explained to Mr. Taylor that he would need to sign a release requested by the buyer of her 
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business to enable her to close on the sale so that she could pay Mr. Taylor from the 
proceeds. (R. 02086 at 5-6; R. 02047.) 
22. Mr. Taylor's counsel stated that she had responded with an email 
requesting a copy of the release for her review and consideration, which Mrs. Taylor had 
not yet provided when Mr. Taylor filed his motion for contempt on January 15. (R. 
02086 at 13-14.) 
23. Mr. Taylor also complained that he had not been provided with a schedule 
for the closing but did not allege that he requested one. (R. 02086 at 14.) 
24. Mrs. Taylor informed the court that the closing had been "scheduled and 
delayed for going on four weeks" and that it was "scheduled to close around this coming 
Friday." (R. 02086 at 6.) 
25. As for the passport, Mrs. Taylor explained that she had previously 
appeared for the purpose of signing the documents necessary to obtain a passport for the 
younger child. On that occasion, however, Mr. Taylor did not have the proper documents 
so she was unable to sign. (R. 02086 at 15.) 
26. At the January Hearing, Mrs. Taylor acknowledged that the special master 
had ordered the parties to "cooperate" in getting passports for the children and declared 
her belief that "I cooperated as ordered." (R. 02086 at 18-19.) 
27. Mrs. Taylor also explained at the January Hearing that she was concerned 
about providing passports for the children to Mr. Taylor because Mr. Taylor was out of 
work and she was concerned he would try to flee with the children. (R 02086 at 19.) 
28. Mrs. Taylor further explained to the court that she had understood that the 
special master's Report directing the parties to cooperate in obtaining passports for the 
minor children was the result of his mistaken belief that she consented to the children 
having passports. (R. 02086 at 19.) 
29. Mrs. Taylor further explained her understanding of the email 
communications with the special master as follows: 
I subsequently contacted Mr. Florence and said, T think 
you mistook - when we originally met, I think I was really 
trying to get along. I wasn't trying to be oppositional about 
anything. You took that as my agreeing to get a passport.' He 
wanted in his order the parties agree. I never agreed to get a 
passport for the children. 
Once I pointed that out, and he said she - a lot of the 
email wasn't discussed. He asked if I was agreeing to a 
passport, and I said no. I said, T agreed with your original 
order. I did cooperate with Paul.' I asked him, 'Now that you 
know that I have opposed getting passports for the children, 
because we have no relatives outside, because they've had 
very negative travel experiences, and because of their young 
age of 7 and 9, and a lot of other evidence that shows they 
should not be traveling along outside the country with their 
dad,' I said, 'Now that you know my stand on that, if you 
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want to make an additional court order that I comply, then 
you can do that." 
He - once he understood that I was not agreeing to it, he 
made no other provisions that I had - no additional court 
orders. I did apply - I did -
(R. 02086 at 19.) 
30. Because the special master did not issue an order forcing her to consent to 
obtaining a passport for the minor children, after she had explained to him that she did 
not consent, Mrs. Taylor understood that she was no longer required to take steps to 
obtain a passport. Id. 
31. Following the hearing, the district court ordered Mrs. Taylor to get a 
passport for the younger child within 5 days. (R. at 02076.) 
32. The court also held Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failure to pay $41,000 to 
Mr. Taylor by January 1, 2010, sentenced her to 30 days in jail, plus a $1,000 fine and 
awarded attorneys fees to Mr. Taylor; however, the court further ordered that Mrs. Taylor 
could purge the contempt by paying the $41,000 within 24 hours and getting the 
passports done within five (5) days. (R. 02076.) 
33. As sanctions for contempt for failing to pay the $41,000 debt, the court also 
ordered Mrs. Taylor to pay Mr. Taylor's attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 02076.) 
34. The court further stated that it was awarding fees and costs because Mrs. 
Taylor had repeatedly changed counsel, represented herself, and put Mr. Taylor in a 
position where he had to pay legal fees for emails and telephone calls. Id. 
35. The January Hearing concluded at approximately 4:00 p.m. on January 25. 
(R. 02075.) 
36. By 2:38 p.m. the next day, Mrs. Taylor's accountant informed Mr. Taylor's 
counsel that they would have a check for $41,000 ready that afternoon to be picked up by 
Mr. Taylor. (R. at 02095.) Mrs. Taylor's accountants informed Mr. Taylor that he would 
need to sign a release in order to receive the check. Id. 
37. Mr. Taylor did not pick up the check, claiming that his counsel did not 
receive the communication until 4:30 p.m. Mr. Taylor's counsel did not respond to the 
accountant until 5:08 p.m. Id. 
38. In her response, Mr. Taylor's counsel informed the accountant that tender 
of the check could not be conditioned upon Mr. Taylor signing a release or even upon 
Mr. Taylor picking up the check. (R. 02088-89.) However, the court did not specify in 
its order the method of delivery for the payment of the funds to Mr. Taylor. {See R. 
02076.) 
39. Mr. Taylor's counsel also informed the accountant in her response as 
follows: 
My office opens at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, and Mr. Taylor will 
be here. If you will have a messenger be here at that time 
with a cashier's check for $41,000, made out to Mr. Taylor, 
along with the release, I will advise him to sign it. We have 
discussed it and I believe it is likely he will sign it but the 
messenger should be instructed to leave the check, whether he 
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signs it or not. Please advise your client that if this does not 
occur, I intend to call Judge Henriod, as I was instructed to 
do, and have him issue the bench warrant for Ms. Taylor's 
arrest. 
(R. 02088.) 
40. Mrs. Taylor delivered the check to Ms. Schmid's office by 8:00 a.m. that 
morning. (R. 02118 at 3; R. 02095.) 
41. In fact, despite the Ms. Schmid's assurances that she could deliver the 
check before 9:00 a.m. on January 27, after learning that Mr. Taylor would not pick up 
the check from the accountant on January 26, Mrs. Taylor picked it up herself and 
attempted to deliver the check to Mr. Taylor at his home that evening. She waited an 
hour-and-a-half for him without success. (R. 02118 at 3.) 
42. Mrs. Taylor then delivered the check to Ms. Schmid's office, per her 
instructions, before 8:00 a.m. the next morning, as instructed. (R. 02118 at 3.) 
43. Mr. Taylor's attorney acknowledged that the check was on her desk when 
she arrived "early the next morning." (R. 02086.) 
44. As for the passport, Mrs. Taylor signed the passport application for the 
younger child within five days of the January Hearing, to obtain the passport as ordered. 
(R. 02118 at 3.) Although she included the notation "under duress," with her signature, 
she did not believe that this notation would prevent Mr. Taylor from obtaining a passport 
for the minor child. (R. 02118 at 3.) 
45. To the contrary, Mrs. Taylor repeatedly notified Mr. Taylor, and the district 
court, that a copy of the court order would be sufficient for the minor child to obtain a 
passport even without her signature. (R. 02118 at 3.) 
46. Counsel for Mr. Taylor wrongly speculated concerning the passport 
application in her affidavit regarding Mrs. Taylor's compliance with the January 25 
ruling that "the State Department will undoubtedly reject it." (R. 02094.) 
47. In fact, Mr. Taylor was able to obtain a passport for the minor child based 
on the documents presented. 
48. Despite Mrs. Taylor's compliance with the Court's order, on February 5, 
2010, Mr. Taylor's counsel filed an affidavit, representing to the court that Mrs. Taylor 
had not satisfied the conditions for purging the contempt. (R. 02096-02094.) 
49. The court noticed a hearing for February 8, 2010 ("February Hearing"). 
50. Mrs. Taylor appeared pro se at the February Hearing. (R. 02117.) 
51. At the February Hearing, Mrs. Taylor explained to the court that she had 
tendered the $41,000 check to Mr. Taylor within the time frame provided but was unable 
to arrange delivery with him until the next morning as directed by Mr. Taylor's counsel, 
despite her best efforts. (R. 02118 at 3.) 
52. Mrs. Taylor also informed the Court that she had signed the passport 
application for the minor child and that it was her understanding that Mr. Taylor would 
be able to obtain the passport with or without her signature. Id. at 3-4. 
53. Mr. Taylor's counsel did not contradict this statement at the hearing, but the 
court adopted the speculative statement in her affidavit, concluding that Mrs. Taylor 
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"may have signed the application for passport, but you undid that signing by writing 
'under duress' next to your signature.'* (R. 02118 at 2.) 
54. Despite the fact that Mrs. Taylor complied with the court's order from the 
January Hearing by taking all necessary action to have the passport issued within five 
days and by tendering the $41,000 to Mr. Taylor and his counsel within 24 hours, the 
court nonetheless found Mrs. Taylor in contempt, sentenced her to 30 days in jail and 
imposed a $1,000 fine. (R. 02117.) 
55. Mrs. Taylor is a pediatric dentist and on the day following the February 
Hearing, had patients scheduled for 7 a.m. appointments. (R. 02117 at 4.) 
56. After the February Hearing. Mrs. Taylor requested that she be allowed to 
call her office to reschedule her patients to another office, but the court refused. Id. 
57. At the February Hearing, the court made no findings but requested that Mr. 
Taylor's counsel "pen some kind of history to the prior similar problems." (R. 02117 at 
5.) 
58. Mrs. Taylor filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the Utah Court of 
Appeals seeking review of the district court's contempt holding, which the Court denied. 
(R. at 02139.) 
59. Mrs. Taylor served 30 days in jail, paid a $1,000 fine, and also paid Mr. 
Taylor's attorneys' fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING MRS. TAYLOR IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR FAILING TO PAY $41,000 TO MR. 
TAYLOR BY JANUARY 1, 2010, WITHOUT ENTERING ANY FINDINGS 
ON THE ISSUE OF CONTEMPT AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT MRS. 
TAYLOR HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS 
WITH MR. TAYLOR FOR PAYMENT. 
Mrs. Taylor's conduct did not warrant the severe holding of contempt and did not 
meet the conditions justifying such a holding under Utah law. The district court therefore 
abused it discretion in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failing to pay $41,000 to Mr. 
Taylor by January 1. 
The Utah Supreme Court has cautioned as follows: 
[T]he finding of a person in contempt and sentencing him to 
jail is of very serious consequence to the person involved, 
somewhat akin to a criminal penalty. It is for this reason that 
such a severe measure is not permissible unless a party has 
manifested such obstinacy in disobedience of the court order 
that it is necessary to accomplish that which equity and 
justice demand. 
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added). "Accordingly, in 
order to justify a finding of contempt and the imposition of a jail sentence, it must appear 
by clear and convincing proof that: (1), the party knew what was required of him; (2), 
that he had the ability to comply; and (3), that he willfully and knowingly failed and 
refused to do so." Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, ^18 (emphasis added). 
It is well established under Utah law that a court "must enter written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the three substantive elements" to 
hold a party in contempt. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). The 
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district court did not make any written findings or order whatsoever, let alone enter 
findings specifically addressing each of the substantive elements for contempt. Absent 
written findings specifically addressing the three contempt factors, a holding of contempt 
is unenforceable. Id.\ Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1977) ("[I]it is our 
conclusion that because there are no adequate written findings or judgment, the judgment 
that the defendant is in contempt and the sentence of 30 days thereon cannot be sustained; 
and they are therefore vacated.") Therefore, regardless of whether all three contempt 
elements were or were not met in this case, the court's failure to enter written findings 
was "fatal to the enforceability of the contempt order." Salzetti, 638 P.2d at 544. The 
holding against Mrs. Taylor must therefore be vacated. 
Moreover, the evidence before the court could not support such findings. Mrs. 
Taylor repeatedly affirmed to Mr. Taylor and the court that she fully intended to comply 
with the court order and make the payment to Mr. Taylor. To that end, she sent 
numerous emails to Mr. Taylor, inquiring whether he would be willing to wait for the 
payment until she had closed on the sale of her business in later in January. She further 
informed the court that the closing and been postponed a number of times but was 
scheduled for the end of the month. Mrs. Taylor had also explained to Mr. Taylor that 
she would need him to sign a release for the closing to proceed, and his attorney 
encouragingly responded by requesting a copy of the release for consideration. Then, 
1
 Although the district court did enter findings following the February Hearing, these 
findings pertained solely to that hearing and not to the January Hearing. Furthermore, as 
set forth in detail below, those findings did not address any of the three necessary 
elements for contempt nor, based on the facts of record, could those elements have been 
met. 
without any other response to the request, or even demand for payment, Mr. Taylor filed 
a Countermotion on January 15 demanding that Mrs. Taylor be held in contempt for 
failing to meet the January 1 deadline. 
Nowhere in the record is there any claim by Mr. Taylor that he demanded 
immediate payment from Mrs. Taylor or in any way rebuffed her request to make the 
payment out of the proceeds of the sale later that month. To the contrary, his attorney 
merely responded that she would need to see the release documents first. Although Mr. 
Taylor argued at the hearing that Mrs. Taylor had provided no proof that the business was 
being sold or when it was closing, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Taylor ever 
requested that information from her. Instead, Mrs. Taylor was led by Mr. Taylor and his 
counsel to believe that her request was being considered without objection, right up until 
Mr. Taylor moved that she be held in contempt for failing to make the payment. 
These facts simply do not support a finding under the first contempt factor—that 
by attempting to arrange a later date for payment with Mr. Taylor, Mrs. Taylor knew she 
was acting in contempt of a court order. These facts most certainly do not support a 
finding that Mrs. Taylor willfully and knowingly failed and refused to obey that order. 
To the contrary, the only facts in the record show that Mrs. Taylor intended to pay the 
full debt, acted in good faith in requesting that Mr. Taylor agree to a later payment of the 
debt, and made repeated, timely efforts to make the necessary arrangements. The facts 
also show that Mr. Taylor gave the appearance of being amendable to these requests and 
never indicated otherwise until filing a motion for contempt against Mrs. Taylor. 
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Because the facts in the record do not satisfy all three requirements for a finding of 
contempt, the district court abused its discretion in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONDITIONS FOR 
PURGING THE JANUARY CONTEMPT THAT WERE ENTIRELY 
UNRELATED TO THE ISSUE FOR WHICH MRS. TAYLOR WAS HELD 
IN CONTEMPT. 
After holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt at the January Hearing for failing to pay the 
$41,000 debt, the district court further provided that Mrs. Taylor could "purge the 
contempt" by "getting passports done within five days and paying the $41,000 with 24 
hours." Yet, the court had not held Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failing to obtain a 
passport for the minor children—but only for failing to pay the $41,000 debt. The court 
arbitrarily conditioned the purging of the contempt order on an entirely new, wholly 
unrelated issue. In other words, Mrs. Taylor could not simply purge the contempt ruling 
related to her failure to pay the $41,000 by paying the $41,000 debt; instead, she was also 
required to obtain a passport for the minor children within five days. In fact, it appears 
from the transcript of the February Hearing that that was precisely what happened. 
Despite having paid the debt owed, the district court nevertheless held Mrs. Taylor in 
contempt after wrongfully concluding, based on the speculation of Mr. Taylor's counsel, 
that she had made it impossible for Mr. Taylor to obtain a passport for the youngest child. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MRS. TAYLOR 
HAD NOT SATISFIED THE CONDITIONS FOR PURGING THE 
CONTEMPT AT THE FEBRUARY HEARING. 
Regardless of whether the district court imposed justifiable conditions for Mrs. 
Taylor to purge the contempt ruling against her, it erred in concluding that those 
conditions were not met. Although it does not appear that Utah courts have directly 
addressed this issue, a determination as to whether one has complied with the conditions 
for purging a contempt order should be judged by the same standard as that required for 
holding a party in contempt in the first instance. Specifically, the district court should 
have determined "by clear and convincing proof' that Mrs. Taylor "knew what was 
required" of her to purge the contempt, "had the ability to comply" with the conditions, 
and "willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so." See Barton v. Barton, 2001 
UT App 199, ^ ]18 (emphasis added). No such findings were made and no such proof is 
found in the record. 
As explained above, the district court must enter written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect to each of the three substantive elements of contempt 
Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). The district court did not do so. 
Therefore, to the extent that the district court must judge whether one has purged the 
contempt according to the same standards for holding one in contempt in the first place, 
its failure to do so by making specific written findings renders the resulting contempt 
order unenforceable as a matter of law. 
Furthermore, the facts in the record do provide clear and convincing proof of 
contempt under the three factors. First, the facts in the record demonstrate that Mrs. 
Taylor tendered payment of the $41,000 to Mr. Taylor within 24 hours of the January 
2
 Although the district court did enter findings following the February Hearing, these 
findings pertained solely to that hearing and not to the January Hearing. Furthermore, as 
set forth in detail below, those findings did not address any of the three necessary 
elements nor, based on the facts of record, could those elements have been met. 
20 
Hearing, as ordered by the court. The January Hearing concluded at approximately 4:00 
p.m. By 2:38 p.m. the very next day, Mrs. Taylor's accountant informed Mr. Taylor's 
counsel that they would have a check for $41,000 ready that afternoon to be picked up by 
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor did not pick up the check, claiming that his counsel did not 
receive the communication until 4:30 p.m. She did not respond to the accountant until 
5:08 p.m., after the 24-hour time period had lapsed. 
In response, Mr. Taylor's counsel informed the accountant that she would be in 
the office the next morning at 9:00 a.m. and that the check could be delivered to her 
office at that time.3 Despite these assurances of Mr. Taylor's counsel, after learning that 
Mr. Taylor would not pick up the check from the accountant that afternoon, Mrs. Taylor 
picked it up herself and attempted to deliver the check to Mr. Taylor at his home that 
evening. She waited for Mr. Taylor for an hour-and-a-half, without success. Mrs. Taylor 
then delivered the check to Mr. Taylor's attorney before 8:00 a.m. the next morning, prior 
to the deadline set by Mr. Taylor's counsel. Mr. Taylor's attorney acknowledged that the 
check was on her desk when she arrived "early the next morning." 
These facts simply do not justify a finding that Mrs. Taylor willfully and 
knowingly failed to meet this condition set by the court to purge the contempt. If 
3
 In her response, Mr. Taylor's counsel objected to the fact that Mr. Taylor would be 
required to sign a release and that he had to pick up the check himself. Although she 
attempts to make much of this issue, the fact remains that Mrs. Taylor did not run afoul 
of any court order with these arrangements. The court made no provision whatsoever in 
its order for how and where the check was to be delivered, yet Mr. Taylor's counsel 
purported to dictate all of that to Mrs. Taylor and then condemned her to jail for failing to 
meet those unilateral, self-imposed conditions. Furthermore, Mr. Taylor's counsel stated 
in her response that she would recommend to Mr. Taylor that he sign the release. 
anything, the facts demonstrate that Mrs. Taylor made every reasonable effort to meet 
those conditions and acted to the best of her ability to comply. Furthermore, Mrs. Taylor 
was led to believe by Mr. Taylor's counsel that she could deliver the check before 9:00 
a.m. the next morning without objection, a fact strongly reaffirmed by the affidavit of Mr. 
Taylor's counsel, Gayanne Schmid. In fact, in that affidavit, Ms. Schmid acknowledged 
that it would have been "unreasonable" for her not to do so. Yet, Ms. Schmid then 
insisted that Mrs. Taylor be held in contempt despite the fact that she personally 
delivered the check to Ms. Schmid's office by 8:00 a.m., as instructed by Ms. Schmid. 
Although Ms. Schmid made much of the fact that Mrs. Taylor initially insisted on a 
release for the check, Ms. Schmid stated in her affidavit that she had advised her client to 
sign the release once the check was delivered to her office. Furthermore, Mrs. Taylor 
delivered the check to Ms. Schmid's office without any release at all. The facts in the 
record demonstrate that, to the extent that Mrs. Taylor was held in contempt at the 
February Hearing for failure to comply with the condition of "paying the $41,000 with 24 
hours," it was an abuse of the court's discretion. 
Second, the facts in the record demonstrate that Mrs. Taylor complied with the 
court's order by "getting passports done within five days." Mrs. Taylor had already 
obtained a passport for the older child, so the only remaining requirement was that she 
get a passport for the younger one. The record shows that within five days of the hearing, 
Mrs. Taylor signed the passport application for the minor child, which resulted in the 
issuance of the passport. Although she admittedly included the notation "signed under 
duress," by her signature, the record plainly established that she did not believe this 
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notation would prevent Mr. Taylor from obtaining a passport for the minor child and it 
did not. To the contrary, Mrs. Taylor correctly and repeatedly notified Mr. Taylor that a 
copy of the court order would be sufficient for the minor child to obtain a passport with 
or without her signature or even her consent. In fact, Mr. Taylor was able to obtain a 
passport for the minor child based on the documents presented. 
Nevertheless, the district court held Mrs. Taylor in contempt for failing to comply 
with its order regarding the passport. It did so apparently based solely on the false and 
groundless speculation by Mr. Taylor's counsel that the "under duress" notation would 
force the State Department to reject the passport application. This prediction of a future 
event, unsupported by any admissible evidence, is not a sufficient basis for holding Mrs. 
Taylor in contempt. It wrongly led the court to believe that Mrs. Taylor "undid" her 
consent by including that notation, when in fact she correctly believed that the notation 
would have no effect whatsoever on Mr. Taylor's ability to obtain a passport for the 
younger child. The court abused its discretion in holding otherwise. 
Finally, even if the determination of whether Mrs. Taylor satisfied the conditions 
for purging the contempt was judged by some other, more exacting standard, the facts in 
the record demonstrate that Mrs. Taylor satisfied the conditions for purging the contempt. 
She tendered the $41,000 payment within the time allotted and made every effort to 
effect delivery in a timely manner. She had no ability to force Mr. Taylor to accept the 
payment. She correctly believed that she had done what was necessary to enable Mr. 
Taylor to obtain a passport for their younger child, and he was in fact able to do so. Mrs. 
Taylor fully satisfied the conditions or, at worst, did everything within her power to 
comply with the conditions and certainly did nothing evidencing a willful and knowing 
failure or refusal to comply. The court, therefore, abused whatever discretion it may have 
had in holding Mrs. Taylor in contempt. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING MRS. TAYLOR IN 
CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH ITS ORDER TO 
OBTAIN A PASSPORT FOR HER MINOR CHILD. 
The findings in the record do not support a holding of contempt. The sole finding 
in the record on the issue of the passport provides as follows: 
Respondent met Petitioner to get the child's passport 
accomplished but admittedly wrote "signed under duress" 
under her signature on the passport application. By way of 
explanation, Respondent stated that under federal law only 
one parent needs to give consent for a passport if that parent 
attaches a document stating that there is a court order in 
place. 
(R. 02132.) This single finding is wholly insufficient to support a finding of contempt 
under Utah law. 
First, as noted above, a court "must enter written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law with respect to each of the three substantive elements" in holding a party in 
contempt. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981). The district court did not 
do so. The court did not even mention the three factors, let alone analyze them based on 
the facts in the record and make specific written findings for each element. Its failure to 
do is "fatal to the enforceability of the contempt order." Salzetti, 638 P.2d at 544; see 
also Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1977) ("[I]it is our conclusion that 
because there are no adequate written findings or judgment, the judgment that the 
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defendant is in contempt and the sentence of 30 days thereon cannot be sustained; and 
they are therefore vacated.") The court's contempt holding must likewise be vacated. 
Furthermore, this single finding does not constitute "clear and convincing proof 
that Mrs. Taylor knew what was required of her, had the ability to comply, and willfully 
and knowingly failed and refused to do so. See id. To the contrary, it demonstrates that 
Mrs. Taylor met with Mr. Taylor and signed the passport application, believing correctly 
and in good faith that this would be sufficient for Mr. Taylor to obtain the passport. 
The fact that Mrs. Taylor included the notation "signed under duress" with her 
signature is of no import whatsoever. The court's order was to get the passport, not to 
sign the application, and the record clearly shows that the notation had no impact at all on 
Mr. Taylor's ability to obtain a passport for the younger child. Mrs. Taylor never 
believed that it would. At all relevant times, Mrs. Taylor correctly believed - and 
correctly informed both Mr. Taylor and the court - that Mr. Taylor simply needed to 
submit a copy of the court's ruling in order to obtain a passport for the younger child. 
Nothing in any court order required Mrs. Taylor to sign the passport application at 
all. Nothing in the any court order prohibited Mrs. Taylor from reaffirming the fact that 
she did not approve of her young child having a passport in the event that she did agree to 
sign a passport application. Mrs. Taylor was not required to cheerfully and happily 
obtain a passport for the child. She was simply required to do what was necessary to get 
one and she did so within the timeframe allotted. 
Therefore, the findings of fact do not provide "clear and convincing proof that 
Mrs. Taylor failed to comply with any court order at all, much less that she "willfully and 
knowingly" did so. The district court therefore abused its discretion in holding Mrs. 
Taylor in contempt for failing to comply with its orders to obtain a passport for the 
younger child. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UNDULY HARSH AND 
IMPROPER SANCTIONS AGAINST MRS. TAYLOR FOR CONTEMPT. 
The district court exceeded its statutory authority by sanctioning Mrs. Taylor for 
contempt beyond that allowed under Utah law. Section 78B-6-310 of the Utah Code 
provides as follows: 
If the court finds the person is guilty of the contempt, the court may 
impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in 
the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-310 (2008) (emphasis added). Despite the clear limitation on 
sanctions in the statute, at the January Hearing, the district court imposed a $1,000 fine, a 
30-day jail sentence, and an award of fees and costs for the alleged contempt. The award 
of Mr. Taylor's fees and costs is nowhere comprehended in or authorized by the 
governing statute. Because the award of fees and costs exceeded the maximum sanctions 
allowed by statute for contempt, the district court erred as a matter of allow in awarding 
those fees. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Taylor's conduct did warrant such harsh and serious sanctions, 
as set forth in detail above. Also, Mrs. Taylor was appearing pro se at all relevant times 
in these proceedings. The Utah Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts that laypeople 
representing themselves "should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be 
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indulged" because of their "lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure." Lundahl 
v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11 (Utah 2003). 
Accordingly, this court generally is lenient with pro se litigants. Individuals 
have a right to represent themselves without being compelled to seek 
professional assistance. Where they are largely strangers to the legal 
system, courts are understandably loath to sanction them for a procedural 
misstep here or there. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The facts of record do not show any indulgence or leniency accorded to Mrs. 
Taylor at all. To the contrary, the court cited the fact that Mrs. Taylor had chosen to 
represent herself as evidence that she was attempting to be difficult and, therefore, as an 
additional justification for imposing sanctions against her. (R. 02086 at 26.) The court 
further cited the fact that her emails and telephone calls to Mr. Taylor's counsel forced 
him to incur attorneys' fees as warranting sanctions, despite the fact that such emails and 
calls were necessitated by her self-representation. 
The district court did little to hide its hostility and antagonism towards Mrs. 
Taylor, as is plainly evident from the hearing transcripts. This hostility appears to have 
colored the court's judgment and prejudiced the court against Mrs. Taylor, despite her 
pro se status. 
Mrs. Taylor was sent to jail immediately following the February Hearing. The 
court refused to allow her to call her dental office to make arrangements to reschedule all 
of the patients that were coming the next morning or even to make arrangements for child 
care. The court insisted that Mrs. Taylor remain incarcerated the full 30 days. During 
that time, Mrs. Taylor was unable to earn a living to support her family. 
Furthermore, although it appears from the record that the court intended to award 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with Mr. Taylor's Countermotion for 
contempt, his attorney submitted an affidavit of fees and costs incurred in connection 
with additional motions, including responses to Mrs. Taylor's Motions for Relief from 
Amended Judgment and Motion to Show Cause re: Child Support and Request for 
Restraining Order. (R. 02162.) The court clearly stated that the award of fees and costs 
were sanctions for contempt and made no findings whatsoever that Mrs. Taylor's pro se 
motions were filed in bad faith or lacked merit. Consequently, an award of fees and costs 
incurred for the additional motions filed by Mrs. Taylor was unwarranted and incorrect as 
a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court improperly held Mrs. Taylor in contempt. The court erred as a 
matter of law by failing to make or enter any findings as to the three elements of 
contempt. In fact, the facts in the record were insufficient to demonstrate that Mrs. 
Taylor knowingly and willfully disobeyed a court order. 
The district court also erred in conditioning the purging of contempt on actions 
wholly unrelated to the matter for which Mrs. Taylor was held in contempt at the January 
Hearing. 
The district court also erred in sanctioning Mrs. Taylor for contempt beyond that 
authorized by Utah law. The court improperly awarded attorneys' fees for contempt, in 
addition to a 30-day jail sentence and a $1000 fine. 
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Because the district court's actions were incorrect as a matter of law and constitute 
an abuse of its discretion, the contempt orders and sanctions must be vacated. 
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IN TflE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MCKINNEY TAYLOR, 
Pelitionei, 
vs . 
TRISIIA RICHARD TAYLOR, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 054300395 DA 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
January 2b, 2010 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
I'ot the Petitioner: Gayanne K. Schmid 
SCIIMID & LUI1N 
331 S. Rio Grande JJ201 
SLC, UT 8 4 101 
Telephone: ( 8 01)5 31 - 8 300 
For the Respondent: Trisha Richard Taylor 
(Appearing pro se) 
Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT 
2/3 Interlochen Ln. 
Stansbury Park, UT 84074 
Telephone: (435) 590-5575 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on January 25, 2010) 
3 TJIE COURT: Okay. Taylor vs. Taylor. I have mulriple 
4 motions from Ms. Taylor, and one or two from Mr. Taylor. I'll 
5 to 1 I you frankly, people, I'm not making nearly enough money foi 
6 doing the kind of babysitting I've had to do on this caso. It's 
7 time for you folks to grow up, take responsibility for youi lives 
8 and your children and move forward. 
9 MS. TAYLOR: Your donor --
10 THE COURT: That said, go ahead, Ms. Taylor. 
11 MS. TAYLOR: I agree with you, your Honor. I'm going to 
12 be very succinct. It wasn't rny wish to be in court today. On my 
13 motion to show cause with respect to child support, it has been 
14 turned OVPI to the Office of Recovery Services, and that should 
15 give us a process for disengaging and allowing them to make 
16 the -- to handle that part of it. 
17 What is showing is that he is current with -- except 
18 there is a balance of $58, and it shows a check for $58. That's 
19 going to be, I believe, the evidence I give you today. What was 
20 not considered is his past arrearage of $406 for May, June and 
21 July. 
22 In Exhibit B the very first -- about halfway down the 
23 page Ms. Schmid sends an email to me that says, "On November 16th 
24 with regard to the motion pending for child support, which should 
25 now be taken care of now that Paul knows what he needs to pay, 
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1 which is $406 for May, June and July " So T show an outstanding 
2 balance of $1718 for that 
3 1IIL COURI Okay 
4 MS TAYLOR I did receive -- with respect to the 
5 petitioner's motion for attorney's fe«->s, I sent several emails 
6 to hi, Counsol requesting that we resolve this out of court 
7 On January /Lh I said, 'I'd really like to discuss this with you 
8 eithrr over the phone or by email I think it would be bcttei 
9 if wc did not have to take this to court I'm looking forward 
10 to hearing from you She responded that because the case was 
11 ORS, -- and I had elected to go that route, there is nothing 
12 further to discuss 
1 i I wrote her back and I said, "In general I think any out 
14 of court procedure to get things resolved is preferable I don't 
lb see ORS precluding your involvement " Counsel did not want to 
16 get involved with this, so I had -- I tried to settle this out of 
17 court So I think her grounds for attorney's fees should not be 
] 8 heard 
19 THE COURT Okay That's all you have? 
20 MS TAYLOR Just here is -- that's -just the statement 
21 from the ORS showing that he does have a balance of zero, but 
22 the $106 that was due for May, June and July was not taken into 
23 consideration When I discussed that with the ORS last week they 
24 said it was ]ust an oversight They reprocessed the temporary 
25 orders, and they were going to include that. 
1 rilC COURT Okay 
2 MS IAYLOR I'm not asking for the Court to do anything 
3 today 1 think it's going to be all taken care of by the Office 
4 of Recovery Services I did try to contact Ms Senmid on January 
5 lb' to TPP if she would want me to withdraw the motion and to 
6 )pp if she had processed any counter motions or any filings She 
7 had written mp an email the previous week saying she needed an 
8 address, and I hadn't received anything from her, so I )U)t at 
9 that point didn't know if she was trying to serve rno with papers 
10 and I wao just contactmq her office to let her know that I had 
11 not received any papers 
12 1 he reason 1 believe she did not want me to cancel this 
13 motion going forward is ->he had plans to bring a counter motion 
14 I filed an objection to her counter motion under Rul«^  101 (b) --
15 or excuse me, (g) It appears that a counter motion should be in 
16 response to my motion 
17 My motion was an order to show cause with respect to 
18 chald support I think her -- as I said in my affidavit, her 
19 real intent for bring the counter motion was to kind of muddy 
20 up this water and muddy up the waters, and she even says in her 
21 affidavit that she accuses me ot coming to the Court with unclean 
22 I h a n d s 
23 So I'm going to ask the Court in my objection to her 
24 counter motion that it should not be considered, that these -- l £ 
25 these really are issues, she should bring them as a motion, and I 
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1 should have a proper amount of tame to respond. 
2 Till: COURT: Okay. 
3 MS. TAYLOR: With respect to the restrajning ordei, with 
4 the settlement that I entered into on April 15th, my goal was to 
5 disengage with the petitioner at all costs. I want to disengage 
6 with him. I just feel like with the amount of emails, you can 
7 s^e that we go back and forth about something so simple as $3b? 
8 a month in child support. It -jusr goes on and on and on, and 1 
9 don't think the petitioner really wants to disengage. 
10 I filed a --
11 Tim COURT: You still owe him $11,000? 
12 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, sir, I do, and I have sent him several 
13 emails about that and to his Counsel. I'm in the --
14 THE COURT: It's kind of hard to disengage when you have 
15 something that big hanging out there. 
16 MS. TAYLOR: 1 agree. May 1 explain the circumstances* 
17 'surrounding that? 
18 THE COURT: If you want. 
19 MS. TAYLOR: I'm in the process of selling my business. 
20 The loan officer for the seller -- or excuse me, tor the buyer 
21 has requested that I get Paul to sign a release of all claims. I 
22 had asked Ms. Schmid to review a release of all claims against my 
23 business, so that $41,000 will be paid out of the proceeds of the 
24 sale of rny business, which should be accomplished, and I told him 
2 5 in January . 
1 At the same time I just -- I found it very odd that come 
2 January 1 , even though the petitioner did not want to clear up 
3 our previous financial dealings of 2009, he was ready at 2010 to 
4 put his hand out and ask for the $41,000. 
5 As 1 said to both of them, I'm more than happy to pay 
6 that. I'd like it to be paid out of the closing of my business. 
/ That is going to be accomplished in January of 2010. 
8 THE COURT: When was the decree or order that ordered 
9 you to pay it? How long has that been? 
10 MS. TAYLOR: It ordered me to pay it January 1:'' of 2010. 
11 THE COURT: That's what the order was, January lr'' of 
12 2010? Okay. Then you're 25 days late. That's not right. 
13 MS. TAYLOR: No. I just -- I had sent them emails 
14 saying yes, it will be paid. Could we please -- and I asked them 
15 could we please clear up 2009 financial dealings, and then move 
16 on to 2010. I don't feel like in any way I have told them 1 
17 wasn't going to pay it, that it wasn't due. I've sent them many, 
18 many emails about paying that, and that -- requested that it be 
19 paid out of closing of my business. 
20 THE COURT: Is there a closing scheduled? 
21 MS. TAYLOR: It's been scheduled and delayed for going 
22 on four weeks, so it is scheduled to close around this coming 
23 Friday. 
24 THE COURT: Let rne hear from Ms. Schrnid. 
25 MS. SCHMID: Your Honor, since November 2009, two-and-a-
1 h-i 1 f- months, Ms Jaylor first appeared for herself She's filed 
2 lour motions One of them is on visitation issues She ha, had 
3 rh'j good >fn)e not to notice it up yet for a hearing, >ince it 
4 has boon mediated, and of course, the special master is supposed 
5 to handle these issues I'd love to have the Court restrain her 
6 from noticing that up, but I probably can't request that 
7 In the meantime as to the four motions she has filed, 
8 ohf withdrew her motion for relief, sort of a Rule 60(b) motion, 
9 had one read the ones, at the last minute because she had 
10 r i M l K o d thdt ohe was wrong She said she did it in the bpst 
11 interests of her family, and to minimi 7e court time with 
12 petitioner, but the fact of the matter is she was dead wrong 
13 She filed this motion for child support -- she actually 
14 filod it back in November What was wrong about this l :> that it 
lb wa, unnecessary She turned it over to the Office of Recovery 
16 S O L V I T e s , and he's current 
3 7 Thiid, she's filed an emergency request for a 
18 restraining order, which I don't even know what it is It wasn't 
19 timely It was not a proper reply to my counter motion, and it 
20 just doesn't e^ist, but I'm going to address it because 1 don't 
23 want to have to come back here again because this is getting out 
2 2 of hand 
23 Ilir COURT Is that the one about email and p^isonal 
24 service rind all the rest of that*3 
25 MS SCIIMID That's what it's about. 
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1 THI-: COURT: Okay. I've read it. 
2 MS. SCI1MID: And then we filed oui counter motion, your 
3 Honor, alloqinq her lack of compliance. Your Honor, Ms. Taylor 
4 rr-fuses to comply with the terms of the decree of divorce. She 
5 refuses to comply with the special master's orders. 
6 She represents herself, but doesn't read or comply with 
/ court rules or statutes, and then says, "Oh, I'm not an attorney 
8 so I don' t know how to do this." She plays games with service. 
9 She insists on calling my office, and then takes whatever 1 said 
10 or my staff says, turns it around, convolutes it, misrepresents 
11 it, and then when I call her on it, threatens to send me to the 
12 stale bar. 
13 When I won't take her calls she barrages rne with live to 
14 six emails per day that if I don't respond to, I get another set 
15 of emails threatening to take me to the bar for being 
16 unresponsive. This has just got to stop. 
17 She files whatever she wants whenever she wants, and 
18 she doesn't care about corresponding with the law. It costs her 
19 nothing. Even if you today, your Honor, deny each and every one 
20 of her baseless untimely motions, like I expect you will, my 
21 client's still out. He's had to pay me to oppose all of this. 
22 He's had to pay me to come and argue this, and to answer her five 
23 and six emails, and to tell her I won't take her phone calls. 
24 The only deterrent is fees and costs, although she makes 
25 $10,000 per month. So maybe even jail time is the only way to do 
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1 it, because if you'll recall, your Honor, you almost had to throw 
2 hor in jai1 just to get her to sign Val Hale's standard contract 
3 forms, and that is what I've been going through, the same thing 
4 all over again. 
5 So now let me get to the motions. Her child support 
6 motion should be denied. As she just handed you, your Honor, the 
7 balance is zero. If there was a mistake on ORS's part, they're 
8 going to collect it. So LL'S totally unnecessary. 
9 Secondly, you have to know what you've got to do and 
10 wilfully not do it. You know, this is the contempt standard. 
11 She hasn't proved that. She hasn't even alleged that my client 
12 knew what; he was supposed to do, didn't do it wilfully or 
13 wrongfully, so obviously she hasn't even recited that lie's in 
.14 contempt of court. 
15 But we want fees, your Honor. I mean what happened here 
16 is if your Honor will recall, there was there arrangement where 
17 they were all going to pay money into a child support fund. 
18 THE COURT: Oh, yeah, a terrible arrangement and I 
19 wouldn't allow it. 
20 MS. SCHMID: Okay. In June you through this out. 
21 Okay. But then we had to figure out what the child support 
22 amount should be, so then we had to exchange income information. 
23 Then we tried to get that revisited. Anyway, it wasn't until 
24 November that; we finally got the final ruling from the Court 
25 where you said 352. 
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1 That day we sent her an email and said, "Okay, we owe 
2 you" -- and she quoted it to you today. He owes 406, or whatever 
3 jr i <j tor May, June, July. He owes 352 for all of these months, 
4 but wc get to take out the insurance premiums. So if we take out 
5 the ins uia nee premiums, it reduces it to 1,125. Paul is going to 
6 send you a check foi 125 this week. Her response? "Don't send 
7 the check. Stop payment on the checks you've already sent to 
8 me," and she turned it over the Office of Recovery Services. 
9 So then she wants to negotiate with me, and I say, 
10 "Iley, you turned it over to the Office of Recovery Services. 
11 Once it goes to them, he's got to make payments directly to thcrn. 
12 They're going to make a decision what's in arrears, and I can't 
13 deal with you anymore on this." Her response? "Oh, you're in 
14 bad faith. I'm going to turn you over to the state bar for not 
15 negotiating with me about the child support. Moreover, we 
16 shouldn't have to pay attorney's fees because I tried to 
17 negotiate this." No, she didn't. She cuts us off and then 
18 accuses rue of bad faith. This is what we go through every day, 
19 your Honor. It's driving me crazy. 
20 So we want attorney's fees associated with responding 
21 to that motion. And then -- oh, and by the way, your Honor, it 
22 gets turned over to ORS. My guy provides all of his premium 
23 information, all of that. She insists premiums can't be 
24 deducted, even though it's bold as brass in the amended judgment 
25 that he's allowed to deduct the insurance premiums. She wouldn't 
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1 t.v«Mi ttll ORS about it, and then when they asked her about it she 
? „ j ^ ( "Oh, but 1 don't agree with that J filed a motion to S(u^ 
3 relief from that part of the judgment " That was the one she 
4 just withdrew 
5 Well, so that's what this was all about So even then 
6 when ORS said to her, "Look, premiums get withdrawn from the 
7 (hild support," she still noticed this up for a hearing That's 
8 why wo want attorney's fees It's not right 
9 Ne^t, this motion for relief, like I said, it's sort 
10 of a Rule 60(b) motion, only she really didn't read the statute 
11 She didn't state any grounds It was untimely because it was not 
12 filed within 90 days after the Court signed the amended judgment 
13 on c»nptember 3"' It was a whole month late, but as you'vi just 
14 heard today, a month late lor her is okay 
15 She doesn't have to pay her 41,000, she doesn't have to 
16 file a Rule 60(b) motion on time She had no grounds to file it 
17 because her attorney got all of the papers, got the amended 
18 judgment, had his time to file an objection, didn't file an 
19 objection. This Court signed it. It was all above board, and 
20 yet she wanted to challenge the insurance premiums because she 
21 disagreed. 
22 What statute, what rule allows her to file a motion 
23 that I'v^ got to respond to and pay a lot of money - and my 
24 client's got to pay a lot of money for me to respond to because 
25 shp disagrees, that's no grounds to -- for relief from amended 
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1 j udgrnen t . 
2 Next, we've got this emergency motion. We want that one 
3 denied, your Honor It's not timely. It went beyond th^ scope 
4 of my counter motion, so it wasn't a reply Moreover, it's not 
5 even an emergency. Much of the relief if already in the amended 
6 judgment, such as curbside pickup and delivery She wants jr 
7 enforced. There's no allegations it's not being enforced, and 
8 moreover it's not an emergency Not going to one another's 
9 residences, it's in the amended judgment. 
10 She wants to call my office in an emergency Your 
11 Honor, our counter motion -- I'm asking that she be restrained 
12 from ever calling my office. I don't want to talk with her 
13 I do not want to get in trouble with the state bar because T 
14 don't have a record of every single word I've said to her 
15 She wants us not to deliver documents to her house 
16 because the kids might get it. Well, she won't give us a 
17 physical address. These are the games she plays on service. 
18 1 ask her for a physical address. "Well, I really don't have 
19 one I can give you." Well, then accept fax service. "Oh, no, no 
20 faxes. I won't accept any faxes." 
21 So what it means is I've got to play this little service 
22 qame of where do I leave the papers. We left them on her porch 
23 after ringing the doorbell because she wouldn't give mo an 
24 address. I'm asking you today, your Honor, as part of our 
25 counter motion that she accept that -- that she give us a fax 
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nurubor and accept fax service, and she give us a physical address 
where documents can be left. It's unworkable, your Honor I'm 
in Salt Lake City. I've got to hand deliver documents out here. 
1 have no physical address to hand deliver them to. It is just 
unworkable, but she plays games. She won't agree. 
What else does she want? She wants restraining from 
telling untruths and exaggerations, your Honor, in court today. 
She wants to restrain me and my client. Well, youi Honor, once 
again, she doesn't read the rules. There's a qualified privilege 
of what's said in court, and we don't do it anyway, your Honor. 
I wish 1 could say I was exaggerating about what this woman has 
been doing, but I am not. 
They're not emergencies. This is not a proper motion 
since it was not timely filed, but I don't want to have to come 
bad, so we'll respond to it orally, and again, it should be 
denied . 
So going to our counter motion, your Honor, we want her 
restrained from calling my office. I've already told you why. 
We want her to give a fax number. I've already told you why, 
and a physical address. Now let's talk about this --- okay. We 
already talked about the 41,000. She's admitted she hasn't paid 
i t . 
She says that she asked me -- asked my client to sign a 
release. I sent her back an email right away saying, "Show me 
the release. I think the amended judgment is sufficient to waive 
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1 his cldjms, but if you need a release signed or your company asks 
2 for it, let me see it, I'll take a look at it." I'm not going 
3 ro agree carte blanche to have my client sign a release without 
4 looking «J I it. She hasn't sent me a single thing. 
5 She hasn't sent me a schedule for closing. She's not 
6 sent me one document showing that this business is even for sole, 
/ has sold, will sell. I have no proof at all except her word 
8 saying, "Oh, don't worry about it. It will sell. Just sign the 
9 release." It's not enough, your Honor. She's in contempt of the 
10 emended judgment. 
11 Now let's go to Brian Florence. We need to get her 
12 straight on Brian Florence, your Honor. This is another V.j 1 l!al<* 
13 situation. Here's what she did with the passports. 
14 MS. TAYLOR: Could I --
15 MS. SCHMID: Your Honor, here's what she did with the 
16 passports. Brian Florence met with them. He's supposed to be 
17 the best special master on these issues between them on the 
18 children. They agreed to get the children a passport. Well, 
19 first of all, she said Nathan's already got one. Well, she 
20 refuses to provide proof of it. 
21 One of the things we're asking for today, your Honor, is 
22 she give us a video of -- a xerox copy of Nathan's passport which 
23 sh** srjys she has. We need to have her do it by a date certain, 
24 because ihc otherwise won't do it. 
25 Now with respect to the passports, they decided to get 
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1 passports Brjan Tlorence ordered it that the parties would 
2 cooperate in getting a passport My client has been trying to do 
3 Jt , I I U P April At first she was going to cooperate She did 
4 show up, but some of the documents were missing, so to her credit 
5 she showed up once Then after that she had e>cuse aftei excuse 
6 Then she changed her mind and said, "The rirrurnstances 
7 have changed Paul has become unemployed, so I'm not going to 
8 aqjrc to get passports anymore because - - because he's 
9 unemployed, he's probabl/ going to run off with these children 
10 and nov/er retuin them " What' Where do we get that from7 
11 But in any event, then she tells Brian Tlorence, "You 
12 can't make rne You can't make me do it " Let me tell you 
13 exactly what she said, your Honor She sent Mr I lorence an 
14 email thot same day indicating that, "After considerable research 
lb on the topic, it is doubtful that a parent -- mother or lather --
16 can be court ordered to give consent to have a passport made foi 
17 minor children this age " Since circumstances have changed, 
18 she's not trying to be recalcitrant She's only trying to avoid 
19 future conflicts about where they can travel and when 
20 So Brian Tlorence sent her back one and >aid, "Iley, 
21 look, T can order whatever I want I've been chosen and 
22 appointed this right If you want to challenge the order 
23 saying cooperate on the passport, do it in court." 
24 Instead she emails him back and she says that she felt 
25 that, "The issue of overriding parental consent falls outside the 
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1 realm of the special master, and asks you to defer the issue of 
2 overriding the parental consent to a legislative body, now that 
3 you better understand my ob'jections ." She requested that he 
4 acknowledge that she had complied with his original request to 
5 cooperate on the passports, and he sent her back a note and said, 
6 "Look, if you feci I've exceeded my authority, you need to appeal 
7 the issue to the Court." 
8 So she's not complying, and this is just one example 
9 of Brian Florence. Your Honor, if Brian Florence's orders are 
10 not -- if she's not compelled to obey his orders or to comply 
11 with the correct procedure for challenging them in this court, 
12 which she has not. done, then we're lost because we're going to 
13 be in here -- and this is your incentive, your Honor. We'll be 
14 in here every week on some new issue, because each one of these 
15 five or six emails I get from her everyday is a complaint, a 
16 challenge, a threat of this, of that, and Brian Florence gets 
17 just as many. 
18 So we need to uphold him. He was appointed to do these 
19 issues on children, and she goes around him and won't do it every 
20 single time she doesn't like how he rules. 
21 So your Honor, we are asking for -- that she be held 
22 in contempt of court and jail time for not complying with Brian 
23 Florence's recommendations that she cooperate on the passport, or 
24 short of that, that she will show up on a date and time certain 
25 and that she show up and cooperate or she goes to jail, because 
-17-
1 otherwise it's never going to happen because she keeps corning up 
2 w i t h <:•>. x c u s e a i tier e x c u s e . 
3 Again, your Honor, we want contempt for the 11,000 she 
4 hasn't paid, and we also want attorney's fees and costs for this 
5 counter motion compelling her to comply with the decree and Brian 
6 l-Morence's special master order. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Ms. Taylor? 
8 MS. TAYLOR: Are we hearing the counter motions? 
9 THE COURT: We're hearing anything you want to argue 
10 today. 
11 MS. SCHMID: Oh, your Honor, I can address this 
12 objection to the counter motion. 1 just forgot I hadn't 
13 addressed that. She claims our counter motion doesn't meet 
14 the criteria of Rule 101(g) so it: should be not heard today. 
15 Once again, she doesn't understand the rule. What it 
16 says is, "Opposing a motion is not enough to get affirmative 
17 relief," but that's precisely why I filed an opposition and a 
18 counter motion. There's nothing that prohibits it from being 
19 combined in one document. 
20 The fact that it has nothing to do with the motion to 
21 show cause, which in any event it does because we're asking for 
22 attorney's fees incurred opposing her bad faith motion, doesn't 
23 bar it as a counter motion. 
2 4 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Taylor? 
25 MS. TAYLOR: There's just so many outrageous statements 
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1 that have been made that are so untrue, I never said half ot 
2 the things she said I just -- if we're going forward with the 
3 counter motjon, I'm just gomq to have to ask for a continuance 
4 and gut a record of what she has actually said. 
5 J think she's completely misrepresented that J send hei 
6 tive to six emails a day. I physically don't have time to do 
7 that. When I do try to catch up and communicate with her, 
8 qranted it has been on occasion -- not every single day -- on 
9 occasion, one occasion I've sent her six emails in a day to try 
10 to co tch up. 
11 I don't even know where to start as fai rir^ addressing 
12 the other issues. The Brian Florence thing is completely 
13 exaggerated, absolutely not what happened. 
14 THE COURT: Do the kids have passports? 
15 MS. TAYLOR: They do not. Do you want me to go throuqh 
16 lhe story ? 
17 THE COURT: He said that you had to cooperate in getting 
18 them passports, correct? 
19 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. When we --
20 THE COURT: And they don't have passports. 
21 MS. TAYLOR: -- initially met with him --
22 THE COURT: I asked a question. I expect an answer. He 
23 ordered partic -- cooperation to get the passports, correct? 
24 MS. TAYLOR: He did, and I cooperated. 
25 THE COURT: Have you signed off on both passports? 
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1 MS TAYIOR When we showed up Paul did not have the 
2 correct documents 
3 TI1C COURT So the answer t o that is no 
4 MS TAYLOR I cooperated as ordered I subsequently 
5 contacted Mr Florence and ^aid, "I think you mistook when 
6 w<^  o u g i n n l l y met, I think I was really trying to get ilonq I 
7 wasn't trying to be oppositional about anything You took that 
8 a * my agreeing to get a passport " He stated in his order the 
9 pa i ties riqree 1 never agreed to get a passport ior t lie 
10 children 
11 Once I pointed that out, and he said she -- a lot of 
1? I the email wasn't discussed lie asked if 1 was agreeing to a 
13 passport, and I said no I said, "I agreed with your original 
14 order I did cooperate with Paul " 1 asked him, "Now that you 
15 know that I have opposed getting passports for the children, 
16 because we have no relatives outside, because they've had very 
17 negative travel experiences, and because of their young age of 7 
18 and 9, and a lot of other evidence that shows they should not be 
19 traveling alone outbide the country with their dad," T said, "Now 
2 0 that you know rny stand on that, if vou want to make an additional 
21 court order that I comply, then you can do that." 
2 2 lie -- once he understood that I was not agreeing to it, 
2 3 he made no other provisions that I had -- no additional court 
24 orders. I did apply -- I did --
2 5 THE COURT- Nathan has a passport, though, i i q h f 
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MS. TAYLOR: Yes, he does. 
THE COURT: Did Paul sign the passpoit? 
MS. TAYLOR: Jt was probably obtained about three years 
THE COURT: And his father signed the application? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, he did. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MS. TAYLOR: So I just think the whole Brian Florence 
and I'm trying to be recalcitrant, there's so many misstatements. 
Since T have told -- since I have cleared up the notion that I'm 
agreeing to the kids traveling outside of the United States, 
there has been no additional orders from Brian Florence on that. 
I stand by -- 1 did - - even though I didn't want to, 1 
did show up that day. I canceled my patients. I took a halt day 
off. J traveled to the Farmington courthouse from Tooele. Paul 
was very dismissive that he didn't have the right documents, so 
we're going to come back. That gave me the opportunity to clear 
up things with Mr. Florence. 
As far as going back to the child support, there was 
an issue that never addressed if she agreed that there's an 
outstanding balance of $1218 or not. If there is, it's an 
arrears from May, June and July, and I don't see how she can 
accuse me of bringing this motion unnecessarily. 
With respect to the emergency motion for a restraining 
order, it was Ms. Schrnid that actually told me in a very hostile 
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1 email thar if I called her of face she was going to hang up on mo, 
2 ohcj was going to get a restraining order against me All - 1 
3 just- want to have rules. I don't think we should Lonhjri each 
4 other by phone. By phone, I think that's by fax, too. 
5 I'm nor sure why she's saying 1 haven't provided n 
6 phy-sjc^l address I cleared that up wath hei I said, "Are 
7 you a s V i ntj a physical address where someone actually signs tor 
o comrrhmq 7" 
9 TIIC COURT: I want a physical address I w.inl it right 
10 now wherp she can serve papers on you. 
11 MS TAYLOR And I provided that to her It's 3?9 West 
12 THi: COURT- So 829 West. 
13 MS TAYLOR Somerset Drive, S-o-m-e-r-s-e-t It's in 
14 North SaJt Lake, 34054. 
15 TIIC COURT- Okay. Is that your residence7 
16 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, it is. 
1 7 TIIC COURT: Okay 
13 MS. TAYLOR: I have never contested that she hand 
19 deliver documents to that residence. I have never said that T 
20 haven't got documents. All 1 did when she sent me the thing and 
21 she said, "I told the messenger to deliver to whoever was at the 
22 door," I simply requested please don't deliver them to my 
23 children. 
24 My phone call to her that day was actually, "Hey, you 
25 asked me for an address and I haven't received anything. Was 
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1 anything sent?" I think for her to say she now needs a fax 
2 machine when she has instructed her staff to hang up on me if 
3 I call i .s a little reaching. 
4 1 don't even know how to explain all the other 
5 ex agger at; ions that I think she's made. I don't know if we're 
6 addressing her counter motion, the agenda items on that. I don't 
/ think it should have been a counter motion. I don't think it 
8 should be heard today. 
9 THE COURT: Why not? 
10 MS. TAYLOR: I don't think there should be a ruling on 
11 it. 1 didn't have proper time --
12 THE COURT: Tell me why. What's your legal reason that 
13 we shouldn't hear the counter motion today? 
14 MS. TAYLOR: Rule 101(g) that says a counter motion has 
1 J to be responsive to the motion that 1 filed. 
16 THE COURT: That's the only argument that you have on 
17 that? 
18 MS. TAYLOR: I.don't have any case law, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? Okay. 
20 MS. TAYLOR: Oh, yes. With respect to the -- her 
21 request for attorney's fees, I really don't know what happened. 
22 We entered into a settlement agreement on April 15,h. After we 
23 signed that; we had some discrepancies about the account. We knew 
24 we were headed for trouble. 
25 You instructed her by minute entry to change paragraph 
-23-
1 17 and 18, and what came back to your courtroom that was :nqned 
2 August 25"' -- or excuse rnc, August 24,h, if you look at the 
3 amended judgment that you signed on August 24th was a complete 
4 aberration of our settlement agreement. That's what I ended up 
5 g e t ting a copy of. 
6 I filed a relief from the amended judgment of August 
7 24Ul. In it it had me paying child support to the petitioner, 
8 many of the paragraphs had been changed. I mean it was just 
9 completely outrageous. I think for her to now say that I'm the 
10 one that's being so confusing, I'm not sure why that was signed 
11 August: 21th, and then a sep -- and again, another amended judgment 
12 was signed on September 10rh. 
13 .She's argued that the judgment requires me -- that: 
14 requires that Paul is allowed to decrease his child support 
15 amount. That was never discussed, either in our settlement. 
16 agreement or in court. She added that, she said, to keep us out 
17 of court. Well, obviously it hasn't because when we originally 
18 discussed Paul retiring right after our settlement agreement, he 
19 represented to the Court that nothing was going to change. He 
20 was still going to carry insurance. 
21 The insurance was $48 a month. Since then it's gone 
22 to $120 a month. I'm not saying that's a gross difference. 
23 I'm just saying it was never in the settlement agreement that he 
2 4 decrease the amount that he was paying in child support, or it 
25 wasn't made in the minute entry that he could take his child 
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support amount of S352 and just decease it. It was just very 
confusing about what amount he was actually going to claim for 
med.i ca 1 expenses. 
THE COURT: State law allows half of the cost of the 
premium for health insurance to be deducted from child support, 
and half of the out of pocket costs. Those are just part of your 
child support. Okay. Thank you. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. In -- could I just respond to one 
thing that they submitted from the Office of Recovery Services? 
They -- beginning February 1st, according to the Office of 
Recovery Services, we're both allowed to carry insurance on the 
children, and we can both submit our expenses. Those -- so the 
payment that he has --
THE COURT: You do that through ORS now. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TAYLOR: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. All --
MS. SCI1MID: Your Honor, could I just -- just two 
things. My problem with this physical address that she's given 
me is that I indicated to her that I would be sending it there 
because -- you know, with a messenger, and that was because that 
was the last known address she had left with the Court. 
Her response back to me was that, "Well, I wouldn't have 
any way to prove that she actually got the documents." So that's 
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1 going to bo - -
2 MS. TAYLOR: That's not what 1 said. 
3 MS. SCMMID: That's going to be --
4 MS. TAYLOR: Could you read exactly the --
5 THR COURT: Shh. 
6 MS. SCMMID: That's going to be another huge bone of 
7 contention when I leave documents there. 
8 THE COURT: No, it won't because you're going to send 
9 them --
10 MS. SCMMID: Because there's no mailbox. 
11 THE COURT: You're going to mail them, and the Utah 
12 Rules of Civil Procedure are going to control. They are served 
13 when ma i1ed . 
14 MS. SCMMID: But then I've got to add three days for 
15 mailing, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Yeah, you do. 
17 MS. SCMMID: Which is an onerous burden on us because 
18 we've got to add three days then onto everything. 
19 THE COURT: It's the way you do every case you've got, 
20 isn't it? 
21 MS. SCHMID: It's not true, your Honor. Every case I 
22 have, at: least I have a courteous opposing Counsel that will 
23 allow me to hand deliver documents at their offices. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I understand what you're saying about 
25 that, but that's how we're going to have to do service from now 
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1 on. We're not. going to do it by fax. Okay. All of the 
2 respondent's motions are denied. As I just said, all 
3 communications in connection with the esse will be pursuant to 
4 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the respondent will be 
5 served by mail at the address that she read into the record, 
6 which is her residence address. If that changes, it's her burden 
7 to give people notice that it changes. 
8 The petitioner's counter motion is granted with 
9 respect to the passport. You have to get a passport for Rachel. 
10 I Passports have to be available to both parents for travel outside 
11 the country with the children. You have five days to get that 
12 done, Ms. Taylor. 
13 Ms . Taylor is in contempt for failing to pay the $1.1,000 
14 when due. For her contempt I'm sentencing her to 30 days in the 
15 Tooele County Jail, plus $1,000 fine. I'm going to allow her to 
16 purge the contempt by getting the passports done within five days 
1/ and paying the $41,000 within 24 hours. I'm also awarding fees 
18 and costs to Mr. Taylor. 
19 The reason for the fees and costs, in addition to the 
20 fact that Ms. Taylor is in violation of court orders, is that you 
21 intentionally engage in a course of conduct to make dealings with 
22 you all but impossible. I have observed this personally over the 
23 time that's been in court. That includes constantly changing 
2 4 Counsel, representing yourself and putting the other party in a 
25 position where he has to pay legal fees for emails and telephone 
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ca.l. Is and other matters which are an entire waste of time;. 
Mo more telephone calls to -- between you and 
Ms. Schmicl. No emails. No faxes. Everything goes through the 
mail. J will expect to hear from Ms. Schmid whether or not the 
$4 1,000 is paid in the next 24 hours, and the passport for Rachel 
is set up within the next five days. If I hear that that hadn't 
happened, T * .13. be issuing a bench warrant for your arrest. Do 
you understand, Ms. Taylor? 
MS. TAYLOR: Could 1 just clarify? You're ordering 
me to get -- as the Court -- or officer of the Court to get a 
p a s s p o r t for Rachel? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. TAYLOR: Even if I am not giving rny consent? 
THE COURT: Absolutely. 
MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
THE COURT: It comes up all the time in divorce cases. 
MS. TAYLOR: And even though Paul is in arrears on child 
support he is not in contempt? 
THE COURT: I thought you said you weren't making any 
motion about child support and that ORS was taking care of all 
of it. You withdrew that. Isn't that what you said? 
MS. SCHMID: That's what she said, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I mean does he owe anything to ORS above and 
beyond the continuing ongoing support? 
MS. SCI1MID: No, your Honor. 
MS. TAYLOR: There's --
MS. SCHMID: As of today he owes zero. She said jn 
court tori ay that apparently there was some rniscornmu ni ca t ion with 
ORS, and there's some additional monies owed. If there is, my 
client is unaware of that, and there is no proof here about that, 
other, than her representation to the Court. 
TIIK COURT: Okay. ORS is in charge of child support 
at this point. If ORS comes to me with a motion asking for 
contempt, I'll deal with it when it comes. 
MS. SCHMID: And the attorney's fees and costs, your 
Honor, I will establish by affidavit? 
THE COURT: Yes, standard procedure. 
MS. SCHMID: Yes, your Honor, and I'll draw up the-
order . 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MS. SCHMID: Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on February 8, 2010) 
3 THE COURT: Taylor vs. Taylor. 
4 MS. SCHMID: Your Honor, Gayanne Schmid on behalf of 
5 the petitioner, Paul Taylor, who is present. We've not seen 
6 Ms. Taylor. 
7 THE COURT: We haven't, either. Let me ask you just to 
8 step out into the hall and take a quick glance around to see if 
9 s he's standing there. 
10 MS. SCHMID: I'll do so. Do you want us to give her a 
1 1 call? 
12 TIIE COURT: On the phone? Oh, that would be fine, too. 
13 MS. SCHMID: All right. We'll step out and do that, 
14 you r: Honor . 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 (Short recess taken) 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Taylor, let me cut through what 
18 we've had here. I understand that you didn't get the $41,000 
19 paid according to the time frame in which I ordered that it be 
20 I paid, and No. 2, that you may have signed the application for 
21 passport, but you undid the signing by writing "under duress" 
22 next to your signature. Are either of those things true? 
23 MS. TAYLOR: I'd like to state an objection to this 
2 4 notice before we start. 
2 5 THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TAYLOR: Just for the record. 
Till-; COURT: Okay. You've stated an objection. It's on 
the record. Now answer my questions. 
MS. TAYLOR: The $41,000 I had ready within 24 hours. 
I did not know that the petitioner would not pick the check up. 
I just didn't think that was going to be a problem. As soon as 
wo found out that he would not pick it up, .1 drove over to my 
accountant's office and drove to his home to drop it off. lie 
w,.i s n ' r. t h e re . 
I w a i t e d about an h o u r- a n d- a-h a 1f, drove back h o m e . 
The fax from M s . Schrnid to my a c c o u n t a n t was it had to be there 
at 9 o ' c l o c k in the m o r n i n g . I had to work at 8, and her o f f i c e 
(inaudible) opened at 8, so I waited until 8 o'clock with the 
check, ran upstairs, dropped it on her desk and rushed to work. 
I did not realize there was a problem. This was noticed up as 
a -- this matter, and I didn't know there was a problem until 
right now, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Tell me about the passport. 
MS. TAYLOR: With respect to the passport, as far as-
federal law goes only one parent needs to give consent if there's 
a court order in place, and all that needs to be attached is a 
document stating that there is a court order in place. 
Till-: COURT: Did you sign the passport and write "under 
duress" when you signed it? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, I did. 
-4-
1 THE COURT: Okay. I find you in contempt of court. 
2 You've got 30 days in jail and a $1,0 00 fine. That's forthwith. 
3 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, sir. Your Honor, 1 have two patients 
4 scheduled for tomorrow at 1 a.m. 
5 THE COURT: That's too bad. 
6 MS. TAYLOR: May 1 just -- all I'm asking for is 10 
7 minutes on the phone with my office to get those rescheduled to 
8 a different office. 
9 THE COURT: No. 
10 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. Thank you. 
11 MS. SCI1MID: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 MS. TAYLOR: I just have to give --
13 COURT BAILIFF: This way back here. 
14 MS. TAYLOR: I'm sorry. Here's my pleadings for 
15 Ms. Schmid. 
16 THE COURT: Does that go to Ms. Schrnid or to me? I hav^' 
17 no idea. 
18 COURT BAILIFF: She said they were pleadings. Should I 
19 just put them in her property in an envelope? 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
21 MS. SCHMID: Your Honor? 
22 THE COURT: Yeah. 
23 MS. SCHMID: My client has -- my client is not allowed 
24 to go to her home. Only the children are there, and she was 
25 supposed to go back to get the kids, so under -- does he have a 
-5-
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right to q o to the house to get the chi1d ren ? 
TI1R COURT: What's -- is it just an order in the decree 
MS. SCHMID: Yeah, it's a restraining order against 
either party corning to the other party's home without written 
p e r in i s s i o n . 
THE COURT: I think we need a third person to pick up 
t h e ki ds then. 
MS. SCHMID: Okay. We'll arrange for that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. SCHMID: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Schmid, would you do findings on the 
hearing? If it's not too much trouble, pen some kind of history 
to the prior similar problems. 
MS. SCHMID: I'd be happy to do so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. SCHMID: Your Honor, you do realize she's appealed 
your decision? 
THE COURT: Oh, no, not aware of that. 
MS. SCHMID: It's on appeal. 
THE COURT: Fine. Sorry about the attorney fees you'll 
incur. 
MS. SCHMID: Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MCKINNEY TAYLOR, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TRISHA RICHARD TAYLOR, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No.: 054300395 DA 
Judge: Henriod 
Commissioner: Tack 
This matter came on for review on February 8, 2010, before the Court, the Honorable 
Stephen Henriod presiding. The Court having heard proffers of testimony, reviewed the files 
and records in this case and being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 25, 2010, Respondent's Motions for Relief from Amended Judgment 
of September 3, 2009, and to Show Cause re: Child Support and her "Emergency Request for 
Restraining Order" and Petitioner's Countermotions for Relief and Awards of Attorney's Fees 
and Costs came on regularly before this Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. 
2. The Court denied all of Respondent's Motions. 
3. The Court granted Petitioner's Countermotion. With respect to the minor 
child Rachel's passport, the parties were ordered to obtain one for her and the passports were to 
be available for both parents for travel outside the country with the children. The Court ordered 
Respondent to get this accomplished within five days. 
4. Respondent had been ordered to get a passport for Rachel by the court-appointed 
Special Master, Brian Florence, on or about May 11, 2009. Thereafter, Respondent objected to 
the Special Master Report and Order filed with the Court and requested that it be vacated. 
Respondent's motion was denied. 
5. The Court found Respondent in contempt of Court for failing to pay the $41,000 
to Petitioner, when due, or by January 1, 2010. Respondent signed a Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement on April 15, 2010, in which she agreed to pay this sum to Petitioner and an Amended 
Judgment ordering her to pay Petitioner the sum of $41,000 was entered on September 3,2009. 
By way of explanation, Respondent alleged that she was in the process of selling her business 
and had asked Petitioner's counsel to review a release of all claims, but did not dispute 
Petitioner's allegations that she had not provided any proof that the business was being sold, 
when it was closing, or even a copy of the release. 
6. For her contempt, Respondent was sentenced to 30 days in the Tooele County 
Jail, and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine. The Court allowed Respondent to purge her contempt by 
getting the passport done within five days and by paying the $41,000 within 24 hours. The Court 
2 
ruled that if these things did not occur as ordered, a bench warrant would issue for Respondent's 
arrest. 
7. Respondent was also ordered to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs. The 
Court specifically found that the award was based on Respondent's violation of court orders and 
the fact that she intentionally engaged in a course of conduct to make dealings with her all but 
impossible. The Court noted that it had observed this personally, over time, and that it included 
constantly changing counsel, representing herself, and putting Petitioner in a position where he 
had to pay legal fees for emails and telephone calls between Respondent and Petitioner's counsel, 
which the Court found to be an entire waste of time. This prior conduct included having to 
threaten Respondent with incarceration at a contempt hearing on October 20, 2008, if 
Respondent did not sign the standard form contract required by the court-appointed custody 
evaluator, Dr,. Valerie Hale. 
8. Respondent did not pay the $41,000 to Petitioner within 24 hours as ordered. 
Respondent stated that she had the check ready within 24 hours at her accountant's office but did 
not know the Petitioner would not pick it up. Petitioner had provided a letter from Respondent's 
accountant indicating that he had been instructed not to release the check to Petitioner until he 
had signed a release. Petitioner's counsel advised Respondent's accountant that picking up the 
check at his office and signing a release were not Court-ordered preconditions and that 
Respondent was in contempt of Court. Respondent claimed she drove the check over to 
Petitioner's home to deliver it but he was not home. Respondent admittedly hand-delivered the 
check for $41,000 to the office of Petitioner's counsel at approximately 8:00 a.m on January 27, 
2010. 
3 
9. Respondent met Petitioner to get the child's passport accomplished but admittedly 
wrote "signed under duress" under her signature on the passport application. By way of 
explanation, Respondent stated that under federal law only one parent needs to give consent for a 
passport if that parent attaches a document stating that there is a court order in place. 
10. The Court finds Respondent in contempt of Court, to serve 30 days in jail and pay 
a $1,000 fine. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that Respondent is in contempt. 
2. Respondent shall serve 30 days in the Tooele County Jail and pay a $1,000 fine, 
forthwith. 
Dated: February ,2010 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form and Content 
Bart Johnsen 
Attorney for Respondent 
4 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), you have five days after service 
of the foregoing on you to file your Notice of Objection. If no Notice is filed within five days, 
the foregoing order will be presented to the Court for signature. 
DATED: February 19,2010 SCHMID & LUHN, P 
/ By: GaVanhe 1}C. Schmid 
\ Attorneys for Petitioner 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid 
on this February 19, 2010, on the following: 
Bart J. Johnsen 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
P.O. Box 45345 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1478 
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Gayanne K. Schmid (State Bar No. 6793) 
SCHMID & LUHN, P.C. 
331 S. Rio Grande, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1436 
Telephone: (801) 531-8300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-2420 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL MCKINNEY TAYLOR, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TRISHA RICHARD TAYLOR, 
Respondent. 
ORDER FOLLOWING HEARING 
ON FEBRUARY 8, 2010 
Civil No.: 054300395 DA 
Judge: Henriod 
Commissioner: Tack 
This matter came on for review on February 8,2010, before the Court, the Honorable 
Stephen Henriod presiding. The Court having heard proffers of testimony, reviewed the files 
and records in this case, made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Respondent is in contempt of Court. 
2. Respondent shall serve 30 days in the Tooele County Jail and pay a $1,000 fine, 
forthwith. 
Dated: February ,2010 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form and Content 
Bart Johnsen 
Attorney for Respondent 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), you have five days after service 
of the foregoing on you to file your Notice of Objection. If no Notice is filed within five days, 
the foregoing order will be presented to the Court for signature. 
DATED: February 19,2010 SCHMID & LI 
2 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid 
on this February 19, 2010, on the following counsel of record: 
Bart J. Johnsen 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
P.O. Box 45345 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1478 
/ GayarAie R. Schmid 
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